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NOTE
Domestic International Sales Corporation as
a Subsidy Under GATT: Possible Remedies
INTRODUCTION
D UE IN PART to labor's increased wage demands and manage-
ment's desire for profits, America's growing inability to com-
pete on world markets in both technical and non-technical industries
has become increasingly more apparent. This fact is reflected most
dramatically in the balance of payments deficits that this country has
run over the last few years,' which have most recently been reflected
in two devaluations of the United States dollar. In perhaps a futile
attempt to put some renewed life into export trading industries, the
Nixon Administration proposed, and Congress passed the domestic
international sales corporation (DISC) program.2
This note is an analysis of DISC in light of the current border
tax adjustment problem, its possible contravention of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' determinations and goals, and the
subsequent remedies available to injured trading nations.
I. WHAT IS A SUBSIDY?
As a result of six negotiations held under the auspices of the
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), an interna-
tional agreement came into effect in 1947' for the primary purpose
of gradually reducing tariff barriers. Since the adoption of the
GATT agreement, non-tariff barriers have played an ever-increasing
1See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 18, 1972, at 1.
2 INT. R v. CODE OF 1954 § 992(1) (A) (1971).
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. A3 (1967); T.I.A.S. No. 1700;
55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1967) thereinafter cited as GATTI. See Jackson, The General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MIcH. L. Rgv. 250
(1967) where GATT is defined - "'GATT,' is a multilateral international agreement
which is today the principal instrument for the regulation of world trade. Over eighty
nations, including the United States, participate in GATT and it has been estimated
that about eighty percent of world trade is governed by this agreement. With the re-
cent completion of five agonizing years of "Kennedy Round" tariff negotiations under
GATT auspices, tariffs for many goods will be reduced to a point where they will no
longer be effective barriers to world trade. For this reason, non-tariff trade barriers of
wide variety and ingenuity are now becoming relatively more significant." (Footnotes
omitted.)
4 See GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S.
(effective Jan. 1, 1948>.
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role in limiting world trade.5 One of the more common forms of
non-tariff barriers is the subsidy.6 Whether intentional or uninten-
tional, trade distortions result from governmental subsidies. In most
instances the cost of a subsidy is borne by both foreign and domes-
tic consumers.7  Regardless of who pays for the subsidy, it is usual-
ly maintained to stabilize a balance of payments position, to assist
a developing domestic industry, to erase a competitive disadvantage,
or to enhance national prosperity by increasing revenues from for-
eign trade. In any case, the goal is usually to supply a given market
(domestic or international) with a particular good in a quantity
which normally could be provided only at a higher price.
A subsidy has been defined as a form of support given by a gov-
ernment to an individual or producer who supposedly performs his
task for the public benefit.8 It has also been called an act by a
governmental unit involving a payment, a remission of charges, a
supplying of commodities or services at less than cost or market
price with the intent of achieving a particular economic goal.'
The form a subsidy can take varies widely. It can be granted
in the form of a direct payment to exporters, or producers, or it can
manifest itself in ". . . measures having an equivalent effect."' 1
Among GATT members there has been no official agreement as to
what specific measures do or do not constitute a subsidy.'1 How-
ever, subsidies can be classified according to their destination and
purpose as either production subsidies12 or export subsidies.'"
In a Western economy, the production subsidy 4 could be said to
exist as a result of a governmentally determined policy that certain
5 D. Wilson, Non-tarif Barriers to International Trade: A Survey of Curraent Prob-
lems, 18 J. PUB. L. 403 (1969).
6 A GATT Committee recently designated the following categories into which all
the 276 barriers fell: Government participation in trade, customs, and administrative
procedures, standards involving imports and exports, specific limitations on imports
and exports, price mechanism restraints and others. 121 EUROPEAN COMM. BULL.
14 (Maech, 1969).
7 H. Malmgren, Trade Wars or Trade Negotiations, 8 ATLANTIC COMMUNITY Q.,
470, 471 (1969).
8See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (1969).
9 See SUBSIDIES AND SUBSIDY-EFFECT PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, ma-
terials prepared for Joint Economic Committee, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965).
0oJ. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT at 425 (1969).
11 GATT: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMBNTS, [hereinafter cited as
GAIT: BISD] 185-201 (1961): 10 BISD 208 (1962).
12See GATT: 9 BISD 186 (1961).
13 See definition infra note 27.
14 A production subsidy is tangible support given to a manufacturer to partially pay
for or to maintain continued production of a commodity.
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products are desirable and should be produced even though there
may be little or no profit derived from their sale. Production sub-
sidies are permitted under GATT Article III, 8(b)15 even though
their net effect is to increase exports. On the other hand, an "ex-
port subsidy" is one given by a government directly, or indirectly
to domestic producers, exporters, or purchasers of a good with or
without a comparative advantage in the world market for the polit-
ical or economic purpose of effecting a more competitive position."6
To this end, economic gains are realized by increasing the exporting
country's balance surplus, or reducing its deficit, along with such
political goals as achieving higher employment rates and reducing
welfare or unemployment payments.
However laudable these goals may be, the various trading na-
tions who are members of the GATT have recognized that the trade
distortions which result from subsidies are in diametric contraven-
tion of GATT's proclaimed objective of liberalized trade.17 While
there originally was no actual prohibition of general subsidies un-
der the GATT,"8 the Contracting Parties agreed in the 1955 Amend-
ment to Article XVI - the principal subsidy regulation provision
- that some measures were necessary to prevent export subsidies
(as distinguished from production subsidies)' from continuing as
an artificial means of adjusting a country's comparative advantage.
This Amendment provided that the Contracting Parties should
.seek to avoid" subsidies on "primary products," 20 yet contained no
"teeth" or compelling language for enforcement. The act of sub-
sidizing primary products was proscribed to the extent that no more
than the product's original share of the world market could be
15 M.A.G. VAN MEERHAEGHB, STRucruRE o GATT, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIc
INSTITUTIONS at 162 (1969). Article III, 8(b) provides: "The provisions of this Article
shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including
payments to domestic producers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes or charges ap-
plied consistently with the provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through gov-
ernmental purchases of domestic products."
16 This result, of course, is premised on the assumption of relatively great elasticity
of demand for the product in the world market.
17 GAT', Art XVI, GATT: 3 BISD 30-31 (1955). "SB (2) The contracting parties
recognize that the granting by a contracting party of a subsidy on the export of any
product may have harmful effects for other contracting parties, both importing and ex-
porting, may cause undue disturbance to their normal commercial interests, and may
hinder the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement."
18 See GATT supra note 4. Also see VON MEERHAEGHB, supra note 10, at 168; J.
LEDDY, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL POLICY AND DOMESTIC FORM PROGRAM,
STUDIES IN UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL POLICY 200-02 (Wikelley ed. 1963).
9 See supra note 14.
20 A "primary product" is a product of farm, forest, fishery, mineral, natural o other-
wise to make it marketable in world trade. GAIT: Annex I, Ad Art. XVI, § B2.
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gained.21  At the same time, preferential treatment was allowed
primary products by exempting them from the retaliatory measures
of Article VI. This treatment apparently reflected the tacit under-
standing among the Contracting Parties of the importance of allow-
ing an emerging nation to develop its "primary products" and that
any limitation on subsidization of such a product might retard the
growth of such a nation's trading potential.
In 1962, agreement was reached among the contracting parties
that non-primary products should carry a stronger subsidization pro-
hibition. 22  Article XVI paragraph 4 was then promulgated to pro-
hibit the granting of export subsidies on non-primary products
either directly or indirectly after a given date when a situation
known as "dumping" results.'s This occurs when the price of a
good sold in the domestic market is higher than the price of that
same good in an export market because of the incident subsidiza-
tion. Seventeen countries, including the United States have ac-
cepted this provision, all of them being industrialized trading na-
tions.2 4 Most of the developing nations have not adopted it because
of their reluctance to be regulated in their subsidization of "primary
products" while the major trading nations continue to subsidize
even their non-primary products.2
The most general application of the term subsidy referred to in
Article XVI (1) of the GATT could come in the form of income
or price supports. No matter what form alleged subsidies take
they would not be designated as subsidies unless they operated to in-
crease exports.26  In this respect, "increased exports" has been inter-
preted "to include the concept of maintaining exports at a level
21 It has been agreed that a nation's equitable share of the world market will be just
that, and no individual market will be looked to in determining a violation. GATT:
7 BISD 52-53 (1957).
22 Declaration of 19 November 1960, Giving Effect to the provisions of Article XVI
(4), GAIT: 9 BISD 32 (1961).
23 Of the various types of dumping - exchange dumping (manipulation of ex-
change rates), social dumping (the use of cheap labor to produce at less than noi'mal
costs), service or freight dumping (supplying cheap freight to the domestic producers
who export), and price dumping - only the latter two are subject to retaliation under
Article III anti-dumping and countervailing duties discussed later.
24 Countries adopting 1955 Amendment.
25 GATT Doc. SR 12/22, at 194 (1957); SR 14/12, at 21 (1959); SR 17/3, at 19
(1968). "Primary products" are products which are easily produced in a country be-
cause of some indigenous material available for its production. For the purpose of this
note both "primary products" and "dumping" will be left for treatment elsewhere.
2 GATT, Art. XVI, par. 1. See also J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND Trm LAW
OF GATT at 383 (1969).
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higher than would otherwise exist in the absence of the subsidy. ' 27
This broad interpretation has been read to include any payment, or
cost savings, direct or indirect, which provided an incentive to in-
crease production which in turn might increase exports of any given
product.2s Concomitantly, this expansive reading is broadened fur-
ther by the "directly or indirectly" language of Article XVI (1).1
Thus a production subsidy prohibition would apply only when the
goods so subsidized were destined for the export market whereas pro-
ducers whose goods are headed for the domestic market receive
subsidies protected by Article III (8) (b).
II. INDIRECT SUBSIDIES
The most obvious forms of direct subsidy are the direct payment
to a private producer, and in some instances government purchases
from specific producers.8 0 Government purchases are outside the
scope of the subsidy prohibition as they are allowed under Article
III (8),"* while direct payments have generally been avoided, be-
cause of their obvious violative nature. On the other hand, because
of their less overt characteristics, indirect subsidies have been used
to reach specific goals, e.g. higher use of cheap raw materials or
added employment, and have become the "darling" of the subsidy
set. 2 Indirect subsidies may take many forms. When a government
27 GATT: 9 BISD 191 (1961).
28 U.N. Docs. EPCT/127, at li EPCT/B/Sr.22, at 5-6 (1947).
29 See J. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 384.
80 Direct subsidy payment does not necessarily mean that a private producer will be
entitled to make a profit as it may only maintain him on a marginal break-even basis.
81 The GATT approval disappears when the goods are then sold at a loss on a com-
mercial scale. GATT: 9 BISD 185, 191 (1961).
22 Indirect subsidies take as many forms as can be imagined. See GATT: 9 BISD
186 (1961). One view would hold that almost any grant that helps a domestic industry
could be viewed as a subsidy because it pro tanto strengthens that industry's compara-
tive position. See C. Mathews, Non-tarijff Import Restrictions: Remedies Available in
United States Law, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1295, 1327 (1964). This position would find
financial welfare, educational facilities, fire and police protection as representing the
polemic extreme of subsidization. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW
OF GATT at 366 (1969). On a more direct level, subsidies have taken on the fom
of cost differential subsidies such as the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (49 Star. 2001-
08, as amended, 46 USC § 1171-82) which provides protection for U.S. domestic
ship builders and operators; accelerated tax depreciation for textile industry. (See I.
KRAvis, DoMEsTIc INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 387 (1963); spe-
cial credit facilities made available to purchasers of domestic agricultural machinery(See Italian-U.K. dispute over credit facilities given to domestic purchases. GATT
Doc. SR 13/8 and 37+SR 13/3, at 181 (1958); GATT: 7 BISD 23, 60 (1959), Greek
credit facilities, GATT Doc. L/740 (1957); a discriminatory rebate plan adopted to sub-
sidize a steel industry (GAIT Press Release 1013, at 19-70 (1967); and frequently
transportation subsidies in spite of a specific GATT prohibition (See K. DAM, THE
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supplies free labor, electricity, manufacturing facilities, transporta-
tion for raw or finished goods for a chosen industry or producer,
this could be called an indirect subsidy. However, to provide these
indirect subsidies actual capital outlays must be made. As a result,
many nations have turned to ingenious forms of tax incentives to
accomplish the same goal. For example, the Spanish have a tax
provision which allows tax free reserves to be set aside for income
derived from export sales.8" A similar provision exists in the Nor-
wegian income tax scheme.84  In Australia there is a double deduc-
tion for export promotion expenditures from domestic income tax8"
plus a rebate of indirect taxes entering into the cost of production. 6
Japan allows an accelerated depreciation allowance for capital goods
used to produce export items as well as an optional reserve fund into
which a company may put up to 50 percent of its earnings on a 10
year deferral basis. 7 France also allows an accelerated depreciation
allowance when the manufacturer exports more than 20 percent of
his goods.8  When goods are exported, income tax is at least par-
tially exempted on all profits coming from Eire, Uruguay, and Iran.89
The Dutch tax authority on occasion has entered into agreements
whereby an importer of raw materials or semi-finished products was
allowed to import without assessing a duty, on the condition that
90 percent of the total production of the importer would be des-
tined for export.40 This tax break is somewhat similar to the "draw-
back" provision which the Canadian Government has used to stim-
ulate both imports and exports. 41
As can be seen, the United States is not alone in the use of tax
incentives to stimulate export expansion. However, with its grow-
GATT - LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 140 (1970)); export
credit insurance has been made available in some countries. Id. at 139. A closely as-
sociated form of indirect subsidy is the "tied loan." Some question as to the legitimacy
of this practice can be raised inter alia on the "most favored nation" principle of Article
I.
W See Spain: A Tax-Free Reserve for the Promotion of Exports, 7 EUROPEAN TAxA-
TION 221 (1967).
84 CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY, TAXATION IN WESTERN EUROPE
1966, 214 (3rd rev. ed. 1967).
3 5See A. M. MOORE, TAXES AND EXPORTS 55-56 (Canadian Tax Foundation
1963).
86 Id. at 56.
-3 W. DIAMOND, FOREIGN TRADE AND TAX BRIEFS 79 (1967). Also, a 3 percent
gross revenue deduction from taxable income is allowed enterprises there.
88Id.
39 GATT, Article VI (4): Interpretive Notes to the GATT, Ad. Art. XVI.
4 0 A. M. MooRE, TAXES AND EXPORTS 9 (1963).
41Id.
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ing balance of trade deficits, the United States has found it neces-
sary to add additional export tax incentives to its growing list of
export stimulants. Before it can be determined whether these in-
centive devices are in violation of any international protocol or an
examination of the scope of the tax rebute or exemption problem
is in order.
III. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Article III, paragraph 2 of the GATT,42 authorizes the imposi-
tion of internal taxes (taxes levied at various stages in the manu-
facture of domestic goods) upon imported products up to the
amount levied upon "like domestic products." 43  These taxes are
levied on imports at the point where the goods enter the country.
They generally increase the retail price of the imported goods up to
or above the amount of domestic manufactured goods. On the ex-
port side, Article XVI allows indirect taxes, which are paid on
"like" domestic products to be rebated or exempted upon export as
long as the remission is not greater than the cumulative tax paid at
all the various stages of production. 4 The difficulty, of course, is
found in ascertaining administratively the exact amount of cumula-
tive tax paid during the manufacturing process.45
To analyze exactly how equitable the GATT rules allowing
border adjustments are and what effect they have on competition,
it is-necessary to determine what effect consumption taxes (sales
taxes) and/or profits taxes (income or direct taxes) have on world
trade prices and to what extent they are relied upon by the major
trading nations of the world.46 There are several forms of indi-
42 GAI , Article II, paragraph 2 provides: "The products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not
be subject, directly or indifectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind
in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moteover,
no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to
imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in para-
graph I."
43 The income tax is a tax on producers, not a tax on products, but the European value
added tax is a tax "on products."
44 GATT: Annex I Ad Article XVI, provides: "The exemption of an exported prod-
uct from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic consump-
tion, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which
have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy." -An exception to countervailing
duty imposition is also made for this action. GATT, Art. VI, paragraph 4.
45 In most TVA-countries this presented large initial problems but were subse-
quently worked out.
46 Foe example, the European Economic Community, America's chief trading part-
ner, relies heavily on indirect taxes, while the United States relies primarily upon income
taxes (direct) for revenue raising.
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rect tax utilized today, all of which are internal47 and all adjust-
ments in regard to imports required by such taxes are made at the
point where the goods enter the country.48 Luxury taxes,49 excise
taxes, single stage sales taxes,g" value added tax (VAT),"' and cas-
cade taxes have all been utilized by various countries and are famil-
iar examples of indirect taxes.
In the United States the excise tax is used on a decreasing num-
ber of items and is not relied upon to any extent to raise revenues.
52
This, coupled with the fact that Article VI does not view remission
or exemption of indirect taxes, as exposing the exported good to
any of the retaliatory measures of the GATT, has been said to put
countries who rely heavily upon direct taxation (a tax on a manu-
facturing unit as- a whole) at a distinct competitive price disadvan-
tage in foreign markets. In essence the United States view of "di-
rect tax" and the GATT view are not the same. The GATT ap-
plies to indirect taxes "on the product" while the United States relies
almost exclusively on a direct tax, (labled as an income tax), which
is not "on the product," but on the producer. Because such income
taxes cannot be rebated upon export nor charged on imports they
appear to be unfair.
Because of the permissible rebate of indirect taxes when a good
is exported, it has been alleged that nations who rely upon an in-
direct tax method enjoy an internal flexibility in their own tax rates
47 An internal tax has been said to be a tax which is collected after the goods leave
the customs in the importing country. U.N. Doc. EPCT/A/PV 43, at 24 (1947). How-
ever practical this distinction may appear it has been refuted. Id. It is the internal tax
that requires "national treatment" by Article 11. U.N. Doc. E/Cont. 2/C.3/SR.13, at
1:E/Cont. 2/C. 3/A/W.32, at 1 (1947-1940).
48 Distinction principle generally refers to tax that is paid upon the product when it
reaches its country of destination and a border tax is levied against it.
49 GATT, Doc. L/234, at 1 (1954).
50 GATT, Doc. 2/729 (1957): GAIT Doc. SR 7/5 (1952).
51 GATT, Doc. 2/421 (1955).
52 For example, the percentage of GNP paid in corporate profit and indirect taxes in
1965 was as follows for some of the major trading nations.
Corporate Pro/it Indirect
Beligium 1.91 12.16
Canada 4.19 14.63
France 2.12 17.56
Germany 2.47 14.22
Japan 3.96 7.76
Norway 1.49 14.99
Switzerland 2.04 7.13
United Kingdom 1.90 14.10
United States 4.50 9.31
Source: 1968 Trade Hearings, infra note 74, pt 1, 55-56.
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without jeopardizing their international trade posture.5" This is true
simply because a rise in the indirect tax rate will not be passed on
to the price of the exported good due to the rebate. This facili-
tates an increase in revenue with no corresponding export market
decrease. In defense of this advantageous tax system it has been
argued that some European countries do have high income taxes,54
especially in the business sector, and that in addition the Europeans
have higher consumption taxes.5 But whether these direct taxes
act to dampen Europe's export business is open to much speculation.
Many nations use a system of directly taxing the income of pro-
ducers.56 The difficulty arises when producers pay a tax on goods
in an exporting country which is a direct tax on their profits and
then ship those same goods to a country which has a value added
tax (VAT) system (such as the EEC). The producer who has al-
ready paid a direct tax on any profit he makes must pay the desti-
nation indirect tax of the importing country to the same extent as
a "like domestic product." The net practical effect of what may in
some instances be virtual double taxation is reflected in the higher
competitive price in the importing country even though the export-
ing country may have had a comparative advantage in that good.
Conversely, goods shipped out of the VAT countries are allowed a
rebate of all taxes paid; they also are not required to suffer the di-
rect tax the importing country imposes on producers of "like do-
mestic products. ' '57  Theoretically, this will not make their price
more competitive in the foreign market, but in practice it does.
The nature of the border tax adjustments, may represent a form
of subsidy by the exporting VAT country. Only to this extent can
an argument be made that this system conforms to the letter of the
GATT, and even so, it is clear that the system does further the prin-
ciples of trade liberalization which underlie the GATT agreement.
How could such a potentially unfair tax basis distinction come
into being? The answer is primarily historical. Under the GATT,
indirect taxes already levied upon the product before export may be
rebated to the various parties in the manufacturing-retailing chain
53 See Maurice E. Peloubet, European Experience with Value-Added Taxation, 30
TAX POLICY 1043 (1963); E. IUndholm, National Tax System and International Bal-
ance of Payments, 19 NAT. TAX J. 163, 166, 171 (1966).
54 See Organizations of Economic Cooperation and Development, Border Tax Ad-
justments and tax structures in OECD member countries, 195-252 (1968).
55 See tables supra note 9. These direct taxes are levied upon the profits of a specific
producer and not upon the individual product itself - thus the name origin tax.
56 Id.
57 GATT, Article III, paragraph 2.
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who have already paid the tax up to an amount equal to the tax on
"like" goods which have been imported for sale in the domestic
market.58 The underlying theory of this provision stems from the
traditional economic model under which income taxes are born by
the producer and not shifted forward into the price of the product
as are indirect taxes.5" Additionally, if not for the export rebate of
indirect taxes, imports would be encouraged and exports discour-
aged.6" Under this same model, assuming pure competition, the
price of the goods is set by the marginal producer. Since the mar-
ginal producer is theoretically just breaking even he pays no direct
(income) tax. Value-added taxes, on the other hand, are added
to the goods at each step in the manufacturing process, theoretically
to be passed on to the consumer in the form of absolute higher
prices. This form of taxation makes the goods less competitive in
the world market, thereby justifying the rebate."
Today, there appear to be two major flaws in this theory. First,
the ever-increasing concentration of capital in any given industry
creates a model of oligopolistic competition, thus vitiating to some
degree both the theory of marginal price setting and total direct tax
absorption. 2  To this extent the direct tax upon producer's profits
can be passed on to the consumer to whatever degree the enterprise
finds -socially palatable and economically feasible. Second, various
pressures which might include competition, government influence
and consumer resistance may have caused the indirectly taxed busi-
nessman to absorb some of this tax. If he does absorb some of the
tax to meet competition in the world market then the rebate of all
prior value added taxes upon export could represent a subsidy to
the extent that the entire amount of the tax is rebated, possibly off-
setting some production costs loss. This same principle applies when
a direct tax on profits is passed on to the consumer as there is little
or no evidence direct tax reductions are shifted forward in the form
58 GATT: 9 BISD 186 (1960).
59 M. Leontiades, The Logic of Border Taxes, NATIONAL ASSoCIATION MFG. REV.
4 (April 14, 1966); 19 NAT. TAX J. 173, 178 (1966).
60 M. Weathers, Some Implications of the GATT Rules Governing the Treatment
of Domestic Taxes in International Trade: The Case of Germany Since the Currency
Reform of 1948, 23 NAT. TAX. J. 103 (1970).
61 This second theory would hold that there would be no absorption of the indirect
tax as there would be under the direct tax system.
62 If a tax is a cost, which is true of all business except a monopoly which passes the
tax along, then it must be included in income and price. R. Lindholm, National Tax
System and International Balance of Payments, 19 NAT. TAX J. 163, 167 (1966).
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of price reductions." In addition, the production unit in both the
direct and indirect instance carries the burden of the tax, no matter
how the burden is measured.64 As a result, to the extent that these
propositions are born out in full, the traditional economic model, as
a basis for GATT authorization of border tax adjustments, is proved
invalid.
The critics are quick to point out that given the lack of data to
substantiate the traditional theory there is much reason to doubt its
validity, especially when excise and income taxes are distributed
throughout the production process."6 Thus the border tax issue has
been called the most difficult question in the non-tariff field.6
Other writers would go so far as to say that most American econ-
omists have rejected the traditional theory,67 while the most critical
have said that the indirect tax rebate is "a conspicuous form of dis-
crimination against U.S. imports. ' 68 Accordingly, American econ-
omists have suggested that the United States change the direct tax
system to take advantage of the border tax adjustment.69 The situa-
tion, as manifested in the balance of payments statistics, has wors-
ened apparently, fueled to some extent by the uniform adoption of
the VAT by the EEC countries and the United States adoption of
the Excise Tax Act of 1965,70 which reduced or eliminated excise
taxes on most import items.
An obvious example of the resultant disparity in the export mar-
ket price for a given item could be found in the French circuit break-
er situation. The French firm could sell its high voltage circuit
breaker in the United States at around $200,000 while the same sys-
tem would cost $350,000 in France. The United States supplier's
price for the identical breaker was around $300,000. 71 This is only
an example of actual pricing disparities which come about due to
the existence of a dual taxing system.
63 J. McNamara, Tax Adjustments in International Trade: The Border Tax Dispute,
3 J. OF MARATIME LAw 339 (1972).
64 See supra note 10, at 179.
65 C. McClure, Commodity Tax Incidence in Open Economics, 27 NAT. TAX J. 189-
195 (1964).
66 Frank, Reducing Trade Barriers: The Next Fold, INTERPLAY, April 1, 1969, at 21.
6 7 See supra note 10, at 178 (1966).
6 8 SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMuNITY,
90TH CONG. IST SESS., THE FUTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY 5 (Comm. Print
1967).
6 See P. Pryer. EEC Border Taxes Import Considered, J. OF COMM., Dec. 22, 1967,
at 1.
70 79 Stat. 136 (1965).
71 J. R. Morrill, quoted in Electrical World, March 11, 1968.
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The ultimate conclusion one must draw from the foregoing is
that when the GATT was drafted, and its provisions adopted by
the United States and other signatories who depend primarily on
direct taxes, some contracting parties did not fully comprehend the
full-blown ramifications of Articles II, III, VI, XVI,7 2 were too
rushed to give these provisions full consideration,78 or never thought
that indirect taxation would eventually play such a major revenue
raising role.74 It is easy to say, in retrospect, that this should have
been predicted,7 5 but then hindsight Often points out the obvious.
Many solutions to this complex problem of border taxes and
taxation distinctions have been put forward. One proposal would
have GATT amended to provide for rebates of both direct and in-
direct taxes on imported goods to the extent that they are truly
shifted forward into price. 7 A closer inspection of this idea would
indicate that not only might this form of amendment end up back-
firing, but unless some relatively simple formula were devised to
segregate tax costs in a given product, the task involved in segre-
gating the tax incidence might prove gargantuan.17
Another proposal has been to either implement border taxes in
72 J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 207 (1969).
73 See E. Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Re-emerging
Issue in International Trade, 9 VIR, J. INT. LAW 82, 114 (1969).
9 See GATT: 10 BISD 201 (1962).
T 5Those who would defend the present system would statistically argue that corporate
income taxes in Europe account for a smaller proportion of gross national product than
in the United States. (i.e., 1.5-2.5% of GNP in 1966 in France, Ger'many, Italy, the
Netherlands and Sweden, compared to 4.6 of GNP in the U.S. and 5.1 in the U.K.
In those countries the corporate sector is smaller and corporate profits account for about
half of what they do in the U.S. This manifests the fact that a larger portion of Euro-
pean national output does not come from a corporate entity. The statuory and effec-
tive rates of income tax are similar in Europe and the U.S. with Japan equal to or
higher. Social Security Contributions are a direct levy and cannot be rebated under
the GATT. These work out to be much higher in Europe than in Japan or the U.S.
If one of the forthcoming suggestions is taken, and these social security taxes are al-
lowed to be rebates, the trade position of the U.S. might be worsened. See STATISTI-
CAL OFFICE OF THE U.N., YEARBOOK OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS STATISTICS, 1967
(1968): J. McNamara, Tax Adjustments in International Trade: The Border Tax Dii-
pate, supra note 68, at 361: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Border Tax Adjustments and Tax Structures in OECD Member Countries (1968).
7 See M. Weathers, Some Implications of the GATT Rules Governing the Treat-
ment of Domestic Taxes in International Trade: The Case of Germany Since the Cur-
rency Reform of 1948,23 NAT. TAx. J. 102 (1970).
77 See, J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 302 (1969) where
Mr. Jackson credits Mr. John Evans with this idea. The abolition of border taxes,
negotiation of subsidy levels, and also the negotiation of the level of border taxes are
discussed. In addition, the direct taxes of the countries now on the TVA would also be
rebated thus only marginal benefits to direct tax countriies would ensue. See Hearings
before the House Ways and Means Comm, on Tarif& and Trade Proposals, 90th Cong.
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 54-56 (1968).
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a way consistent with the principles of Article II (which would al-
low countervailing duties) or to set the border taxes at a more real-
istic rate in line with the theory that indirect taxes are not entirely
shifted forward.7s The Department of Commerce has proposed that
the United States adopt a VAT system of its own."' Although this
proposal is currently being studied, it has been said that if only this
change in the present tax structure were made there would probably
be no significant trade benefits accruing,"' because if only the cor-
porate income tax on profits were reduced, benefit could be derived
to the extent that the costs are passed along to the export customer
in the form of lower prices (assuming high elasticity of demand for
the given product)."1
Criticizing the tax incentives already enacted by the United
States Congress which contemplate future additional tax "incen-
tives," some commentators have argued that tax incentives are no
more than "windfalls" to the exporter as there really is no evidence
that the incentives will expand exports.8 2 In spite of this argument,
the United States government has introduced export incentives via
the tax mechanism, regardless of GATT consequences, on the prem-
ise that "practical experience suggests that export tax incentives
will work."S It should be pointed out, however, that prior to the
DISC several somewhat similar tax incentives were tried, each meet-
ing limited acceptance and success. These will be discussed later in
this paper."
IV. U.S. "SuBSIDIES" - TAx INCENTIVES
On December 16, 1971, President Nixon signed into law a tax
provision designating a Domestic International Sales Corporation
(DISC) which would allow a 50 percent tax deferral on corporate
profits derived from foreign activities to a corporation that met the
78 Proposal of the Synthetic Organic Chemicals Manufacturing Association to Sen-
ate Finance Comm. In Anderson, Border Taxes, Fair or Unfair, CHEM. Or ENG. NEWS,
Jan. 22, 1968, at 66.76-77.
79 See DBPT. OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES FORIEGN TRADE: A FIvB YEAR OUT-
LOOK (1969).
80 See J. McNamara, supra note 63, at 339.
81 Id. See also, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS TAXA-
TION 65-69 (1970).
82 Surry, Current Issues in the Taxation of Corporate P6reign Investment, 56 COLUM.
L REV. 815, 845-46 (1956); A. M. MOORE, TAXES AND ExPORTS (Canadian Tax
Foundation 1963).
88T. Jenks, The Export Trade Corporation: Orphan of the Storm, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1187, 1208 (1967).
84 These will be discussed later in this paper.
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included requirements. The main policy objective of this legislation
was to stimulate U.S. exports by allowing generous tax deferral
privileges to domestic corporations.8 5 More specifically, the DISC
provision was included in the Revenue Act of 1971,6 and could
be adopted by a qualified corporate entity chartered in any state. It
must be a corporation which sells or services goods in foreign coun-
tries, the income from which is substantially (95 percent of gross
receipts) " derived from exports. Income can come from sales, rent-
als, loans to other exporters, or interest from export obligations."8
This sales corporation must make an election to be treated as a
DISC, the prerequisite of which is inter alia stated capital of at least
$2,500.89 In addition to maintaining its DISC status, the corpora-
tion must continually meet the 95 percent qualified assets test. This
test may be met by the corporation holding assets in the form of
assets needed to carry on the direct export business, investments in
stock or securities of foreign customers, loans to domestic producers,
or temporary deposits in the United States or Export-Import Bank
paper.9" The 50 percent tax deferral does not include income de-
rived from loans to domestic producers, or on U.S. deposits.9
The tax deferral provided for in DISC exists until the tax in-
come is distributed, liquidation occurs, or the corporation is disqual-
ified as a DISC. If either of these latter two situations occur, the
tax on the deferral income may be prorated over a 10 year period.
Additional criteria must be met in order for a corporation to
maintain its status as a DISC. At least 50 percent of the total cost
of the export property must be made or produced in the United
States.92 As an added incentive to the 50 percent tax deferral, 10
percent of the deferral amount can be added for "export promotion-
al expenses." '93 Another important feature of the DISC is that ac-
cumulated earnings tax 4 and personal holding company9 5 provi-
85 R. Bagley, A DISC in Your Future, TAXES at 548, Sept. 1970.
86 Revenue Act of 1971, Act Sec. 501, 502 (e), and 503 (d), adding Code Sec. 992
(a), (d) and (e), and amending Code Secs. 922 and 931(a). U.S.C. § 1221, 1227, 1228.
8 See supra note 85 at 552.
88 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 992 (a) (1) (A) (1971).
89 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 992 (a) (1) (C) (1971).
O0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 992 (a) (1) (B) (1971).
91 Id.
92 This limitation, it could be argued, effectively excluded participation by foreign
goods and to treat extant acts as a subsidy to the whole American made portion of the
exported good.
93 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 992 (a) (2) (1971).
94 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 531-537 (1973).
[Vol. 5: 87
DISC UNDER GATT
sions do not apply to it. A DISC cannot engage in the manufac-
turing of the product it sells or services overseas; to do so would be
to jeopardize its DISC qualification. As opposed to an Export
Trade Corporation (ETC), the DISC has no limitations upon the
amount of income that can be tax deferred. Unlike the ETC, no
limitation exists as to whom a DISC can sell goods or from whom it
buys. Furthermore, an ETC as a foreign corporation, cannot shield
as much income from United States taxation as can a DISC.96
The United States provides several other tax relief provisions
designed both to stimulate exports and to recover lost tax revenues
due to foreign incorporation. The Western Hemisphere Trade Cor-
poration (WHTC)9" provision of the Internal Revenue Code ap-
plies to a domestic corporation and grants a tax reduction (down to
about 34 percent), but only to corporations who export solely to the
Western Hemisphere.9"
The underlying purpose of both the ETC and WHTC legisla-
tive grants was to make exporting for U.S. manufacturers at least
as profitable taxwise as selling from foreign plants. More dramati-
cally, Subpart G, which granted a deferral privilege on income
where the business engaged in improved the balance of payments
position of the United States, was passed with the obvious intention
of offering ". . . encouragement to export trade."' Unfortunately,
none of the goals of these tax entities has been achieved due to the
lack of taxpayer acceptance. This in turn was based chiefly upon
the highly complex nature of the provisions, the numerous restric-
95 54 MINN. L. REv. 245 (1970); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 541-547 (1973).
9 6 R. Bagley, A DISC in Your Future, 48 TAxEs, 556.
97 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 921.
9 8 INT. RE V. CODE OF 1954 § 992 (a) (1) (1971). A further r'estriction in the
WHTC is that it not have any overseas operating bases. Subpart F (ETC), being more
like a DISC allows a corporation, which qualifies to defer Subpart F income if it is ex-
port trade income. This deferral is allowed if the ETC engages in "substantial export
activity," and the deferrable income is then reinvested in facilities and assets that expand
export trade. Additional ETC restrictions demand that for the three years immediately
prior to a taxable year, 90 percent of gross income comes from sources outside the U.S.
See A. Shenk, J. Balkin, Subpart G. Tax Incentives for Export Trade: A Technical
Analysis of Tax Haven Operations, 54 MINN. L. REV. 245 (1970). 15 percent of income
comes from the exportation of U.S. go6ds or services, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 954
(b) (1) (1971), where as the WHTC requires that 90 percent of this corporation's ac-
tivities must be from trade or business and 90 percent of its income f rom sources out-
side the U.S., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 970-72 (1971). Also, the vendor or lessee of
ETC goods must be "unrelated" to the export trade corporation. S. Rep. No. 1881;
87th Cong. 2d Sess. 91 (1962). Another provision is an appendage to Subpart F,
Subpart G, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 970-72 (1971). Return for certain tax exemp-
tions, requires income from the sale of domestically produced goods to be reinvested in
qualified foreign assets.
99 S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1962).
1972)
CASE W. RES. J. INrL L.
tions, and the limited tax benefit derived. 100 On the other hand, the
reduction of complex restrictions and generous income tax deferral
contained in DISC may prove to be enough to sell it to American
exporters.
Whether the DISC will gain any wider acceptance than the tax
incentives mentioned above remains to be seen. Other problems,
such as whether DISC's deferral system as an export incentive may
be contrary to our international trade commitments as manifested
in GATT should in reality be faced before too many exporters be-
gin to rely upon it as a mode of business behavior.
V. DoEs THE DISC VIOLATE THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRDE?
Even though the granting of tax exemptions by various coun-
tries is wide spread1 ' it is important for taxing authorities to at least
consider the legal ramifications of granting such potential subsidies
in light of the broad prohibitions in GATT. This analysis must be
done if only to ensure and maintain cooperative adherence to the
GATT.
Perhaps the first and most difficult question to resolve concern-
ing the DISC is its tax defferal aspect. Nowhere in GATT is there
reference to the consequent action that is allowed nor the legality
of a tax deferral per se. Presumably sufficient facts could be brought
forward to establish that the deferral was a smoke screen for an ex-
emption. However, since this cannot be established with any clar-
ity, the deferral system cannot be said to be directly covered by
any provision of the GATT. Yet considering that time means
money, a long enough deferral period could well approach an ex-
emption for tax purposes.0 2 At least this is what a GATT Work-
ing Party could conclude.' 3
100 T. Jenks, The Export Trade Corporation: Orphan ot the Storm, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 1187, 1205 (1967).
101 Id. at 1207.
102 R. Bagley, A DISC in Your Future, 48 TAxEs, 548, 552.
103 A Working Party-is an Ad Hoc Committee set up by the Contracting Parties
to settle disputes among member countries. See GATT, Art. XVI (A)(1) which pro-
vides: If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of
income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any
product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the
Contracting Parties in writing of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the
estimated effect of the subsidization on the quality of the affected product or products
imported into or exported from its territory and of the circumstances making the subsidi-
zation necessary. In any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to the in-
terests of any other contracting party is caused or threatened by any such subsidization,
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Because the DISC deals with the deferral of direct taxes, it is
essential to determine if the GATT provides for the exemption of
producers from direct taxes. As far as a subsidy is defined Article
XVI and VI purposes,' the major trading nations have defined it
to include rebates and exemptions of direct taxes, social welfare, or
charges on commercial enterprises 1 5 as distinguished from "duties
and taxes born by the like product."' 0' The thought and intent may
have been there in the 1960 Working Party'07 proposal put forth
above, but no substantive definition of subsidy was established.'0"
Although there was no binding effect given to this proposal, it does
indicate a general concensus within that Working Party on the
question of exemptions and rebates of direct taxes. This Panel did
agree that a subsidy which provided incentive, although not calling
for countervailing measures, would for the sake of Article XVI (1)
be assumed to increase exports or reduce imports. 09 From the read-
ing of the DISC statute, it would be difficult to argue its purpose
was not export oriented, thus meeting at least the Article XVI (1)
minimum definition of a subsidy.
Along this same line, it has been said that the purpose of pref-
erential tax treatment is to provide an incentive to, or to stimulate
the growth of a particular type of business activity, and that this
the contracting party granting the subsidy shall upon request, discuss with the other con-
tracting party of parties concerned, or with the Contracting Parties, the possibility of
limiting the subsidization.
104 Art. VI provides in part:
The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of one country are
introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the
products, is to be condemned if it causes of "threatens" material injury to an established
industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of
a domestic industry. For the purposes of this Article, a product is to be considered as
being int'oduced into the commerce of an importing country at less than its normal
value, if the price of the product exported from one country to another
(a) is- less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product
when destined for consumption in the exporting country, ot'
(b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third coun-
try in the ordinary course of trade, of(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable
addition for selling cost and profit.
Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in conditions and terms of
sale, for differences in taxation, and fof other differences affecting price comparability.
10 5 See "Declaration Giving Effects to the Provisions of Article XVI: 4 (1963), 3
UST 2605, T.I.A.S. No. 5227, 445 U.N.T.S. 294: GATT 9 BISD 185-88 (1961).
106 See GATT: Annex I, Ad Article XVI, supra note 44.
107 A Working Party is a group of Contracting Parties working on a special problem.
lO8 See GAT: 9 BISD 187 (1961).
109 Id. at 191.
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should be considered a form of subsidy."' Although this could be
partially countered by the fact that a DISC has a broader applica-
tion than to one industry, it might still further help categorize the
DISC as a subsidy.
Further arguments could be marshalled against the DISC defer-
ral plan. For example, Article III, paragraph 8,11 permits payments
of subsidies to domestic "producers." It does not address itself to
domestic exporters. Whether a DISC could be considered a pro-
ducer within the broadest sense of the language is questionable as it
is in reality only a forwarding sales corporation." 2
Another challenge to the deferral system might come under the
Addition to Article XVI, which provides:
The exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes
borne by the like product when destined for domestic consump-
tion, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in ex-
cess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a sub-
sidy." 3
This language would allow an exemption from duties or taxes if
the same "product" when shipped domestically had similar taxes
attached. Here, the exemption or rebate on the exported goods
would not be considered a subsidy if it did not exceed those born
by the domestic goods. Once again an interpretive problem -
which could prove fatal to a direct tax rebate - appears in the lan-
guage "like product" as opposed to like producer. Lack of inclif-
sion here logically indicates exclusion of direct tax rebates, or exemp-
tions, from the GATT's intent to exempt only indirect taxes from
application of Article XVI sanctions. On the other side of the ar-
gument, as far as DISC's treatment of tax deferral in relation to
Article III, paragraph 2 is concerned, 5 percent of its products may
be sold domestically. The income generated by those sales is eli-
gible for, and inclusive in, the 50 percent deferred income category.
That being the case, the Article III requirement for equal treat-
ment for export and domestic sales would not appear to have been
met. While this same problem would not be present in the West-
ern Hemisphere Trade Corporation, it has been said to be debat-
able whether the WHTC rate reduction violates any other provi-
"lOE. OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT, 572, 557 (1961).
"'1See GATT, Article III (8) (b), supra note 3.
112 If the DISC were included in such characterization the result would be to facili-
tate an internal conflict between Article III, 8(b), allowing production subsidies, and
the Article XVI paragraph 1 language "increases exports." The lack of desirability of
this result most likely would work against this definition of "producer."
118 GATT: Annex I, Ad Article XVI, supra note 44.
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sion of the GATT."4 Moreover, the preferential treatment for in-
come generated by sales establishments abroad "does not seem objec-
tionable," and certainly tax deferment, as exemplified by Subpart G
'of the Internal Revenue Code said not to be prohibited." 5 It has
also been said that it is the form of the tax exemption that was
determinative, not the fact." 6  However, without further analysis,
this conclusion appears inadequate in light of the numerous GATT
provisions that bear on the problem of a deferral system.
Another well-founded interpretive argument could be made that
Article VI, paragraph 4,109 phrased in the negative, would prevent
countervailing duties from being levied upon a "product" by an im-
porting country because of the exemption from taxes or duties in
the exporting country when the internal products of that country do
bear the tax.117 Once again the "product" language steps in to defeat
the American producer tax deferral. This is supported to some ex-
tent by the statement that the "product" language of GATT, Arti-
cles XVI and VI, paragraph 4, was not meant to include taxes lev-
ied on the producer.11 Where does the non-producer middleman of
DISC fit into this scheme? One answer would appear to be simply
that he pays income tax and this is not excepted from Article VI,
paragraph 4 treatment.
As the DISC does not deal with the imposition of internal taxes
upon imported products, it cannot be argued that its favorable treat-
ment of export subsidies is contrary to Article III, paragraph 2,
dealing with "national treatment" of domestic and imported prod-
ucts. Because of the high percentage of the DISC product that must
be sold in foreign countries (95 percent) this would act to counter
,an attack on it as being contrary to the "national treatment" policy
expounded upon in Article III, paragraphs 2 and 4.119
114 T. Jenks, The Export Trade Corporation: Orphan of the Storm, 67 COLUM. L
REv. 1187, 1207 (1967).
115Id.
116 Id.
117 GATT, Article VI, paragraph 4 provides: "No product of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting patty shall be sub-
ject to anti-dumping or countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such prod-
uct from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for consumption in
the country of origin or exportation, or by reason of the refund of such duties or taxes."
l 8 See supra note 44.
119 See GATT, Article III paragraph 2, note 10. Paragraph 4 provides:
"The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and require-
ments affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribu-
tion or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differ-
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Paragraph 8 (b) of Article 111,12' providing for subsidies to do-
mestic producers from funds raised internally, would arguably not
authorize DISC tax deferrals. The basis for this argument is found
in the interpretation of the word "producer." A "producer," for the
purposes of Article III, paragraph 8(b), is one who manufactures
a product. Since the DISC is not by definition a producer but mere-
ly an exporting sales organization, it should not qualify for this ex-
emption. Also, since the exclusive treatment of imports in kind and
degree would be found to be a violation of Article 111,121 it could
be argued by analogy that exports should not be specially treated.
Paragraph 8(b) would vitiate the argument that the 5 percent do-
mestic sales would be allowed in view of the paragraph 2 language
preventing "laws, regulations, and requirements affecting internal
sales," from being applied "so as to afford protection to domestic
production" as prescribed in paragraph 1 of the same article.
Finally, if it were found necessary to defend against a counter-
vailing duty, an argument could be made that in spite of the fore-
going, the deferred tax of DISC is technically not an exemption or
remission as referred to in Article VI, paragraph 4, but merely tax-
able income set aside in a reserve. In the short run, the result
would appear to be the same, as an exemption or rebate, but in the
long run there would be no -tax advantage. If a GATT Working
Party were to confront these arguments it is conceivable that it
ential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic
operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product." A spe-
cious argument may also be made that the "national treatment" of Article III, paragraph
2, requites that imported and domestic products be treated identically and that allowing
deferral of income on only domestically produced goods is in contravention of that
mandate. The flaw in this reasoning is that imported products themselves are not sub-
ject to income taxes in the United States and therefore not subject to differlent treatment
as therein prescribed. The only "non-national" treatment involved would be the tax
treatment of a domestic corporation when it exports domestic goods as opposed to pre-
viously imported goods. However, it is doubtful that Article III speaks to the secondary
export of a previously imported product. However, if the goods included in the 5
percent domestic sales allowed the DISC were priced so as to reflect such tax deferral
there may be an arguable violation of Article III, paragraph 2, and provide domestic
protection contravening paragraph 1 (to the extent the deferral was shifted into price
in the domestic market). On the other hand, since the direct tax would not touch the
imported product, the protection of the DISC-sold product would appear to fall into
the realm of protected behavior'. The Havana Reports III, U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/8 at 63,
paragraph 44 (1948) indicate that exemption from income tax does not come within
the prescribed behavior of paragraph 2. In conjunction with the deferral, when the
DISC product is sold in an export market at a higher price than in the domestic malrket
this may create a dumping situation subject to anti-dumping duties provided for in
Article VI. Consequently, the pricing policies of the DISC must be carefully scruti-
nized.
120 See supra note 15.
121 GATT: 5 BISD 185 (1957): GATT ANALYTICAL INDx 24 (2d rev. 1966).
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could find the DISC contrary to the general principles of trade lib-
eralization as provided for by the GATT preamble and subject to
any or all the remedial relief provided in the agreement.
VI. REMEDIES
Originally, Section A, Article XVI, governing both export and
production subsidies, was the only proscription in the GATT. 2 2 Un-
fortunately, the requirements of this section called only for notifica-
tion and consultation when a subsidy on an imported product was
discovered by the importing country.1 28 The generally proscribed
subsidy could take on almost any form, as long as it operated to "in-
crease exports of any product from" any territory (member country).
Ideally, the subsidizing country would notify the importing country
of the type, effect, and extent of the exporting or production sub-
sidy and why it was necessary to grant it. Also, when "serious in-
jury" to the commercial interests of the importing country were
found, various levels of distribution were provided.
Production subsidies presumably would be included in this re-
porting requirement, but allowed as per Article III, paragraph 8(b).
However, the residual export subsidies certainly would be subject
to the reporting requirements. In addition, soon after the GATT
was adopted, the "increased exports" language was determined to
include the maintenance of exports at a higher than normal level. 2 4
The expanded prohibition had only limited effect because, as with
the original uninterpreted prohibition, it did not apply to subsidies
that were given prior to each country's adoption of the protocol
agreement. 125
Having realized that many subsidies would stay in effect in spite
of the work sanctions of paragraph (1), it was decided by a Work-
ing Party in 1955 that the objectives of free trade could best be
realized if export subsidies - which most dramatically distort the
comparative advantages of trading countries - could be brought
under more stringent controls.1 26  Thus, Section B of Article XVI
was adopted. The free trade goal was articulated in paragraph 2
as the desired end. Paragraph 3 addressed itself to the export sub-
12See GAT'T, Article XVI(A) (1), supra note 103.
128 GATT, Article XVI (A)(1), suPra note 103.
1
2 4 GATT: 2 BISD 39, 44 (1950).
125 Protocol Amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of GATT, 1955.
12 6 See 445 U.N.T.S. 294, 298, 302, 303 (1962) : It was put into effect in 1960 and
accepted by 17 countries, GATT: 9 BISD 32 (1961),
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sidy on "primary products" in terms of maintaining a given percent-
age of the world market. For the purpose of this discussion, how-
ever, the exportation of manufactured goods will be dealt with sole-
ly, thus ignoring the major ramification of this provision. To this
end, paragraph 4 is of more crucial significance.
Article XVI, paragraph 4,127 basically attempts to temporarily
halt, and ultimately eliminate, all export subsidies which tradition-
ally lead to a "dumping" situation. By specific exclusion, it did not
apply to primary products which were provided for in paragraph
3, and applies only to those countries who adopted the 1955 Amend-
ment, and to those signing the Declaration accompanying paragraph
4. This paragraph would obviously be called into action if the
DISC exported non-primary products and the price of those prod-
ucts, in the importing country was less than in the United States.
The tax deferral of DISC would have to be shown as the "causal"
factor for the actual or threatened "serious prejudice" called for
in Article XVI, paragraph 1, ultimately calling for discussions with
the injured party12 8
In sum, Article XVI has not been used to any large extent be-
cause of its generally ineffective remedial sanctions. The notifica-
tion provision specifically has not been used because of the reluc-
tance on the part of most developed countries to point an accusative
finger at another contracting party in view of their own subsidiza-
tion programs.2 9 If it were not for its lack of stringentness, this
article would appear more desirable as a means of remedy because
it does not require prior GATT authorization to put it into effect as
does Article XXIII.180
Article VI generally, and the countervailing duties' 8 ' provisions
of paragraph 3-6 more specifically, are utilized via domestic legisla-
127 GATT, Article XVI, paragraph 4 allows:
Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter, contfacting
parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on the
export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in the sale-of
such product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like
product to buyers in the domestic market. Until 31 December 1957 no contracting
party shall extend the scope of any such subsidization beyond that existing on 1 Janu-
ary 1955 by the introduction of new, or the extension of existing subsidies.
128 See supra note 103.
129 Most importantly, anti-dumping provisions of Article VI would be available. This
is not likely to be the case if the tax deferral allowed the DISC is passed on via the 5
percent domestic sales generated by the company.
ISOGATT: 10 BISD 206, 207, 5 20 (1962).
181 The term "countervailing duty" shall be understood to mean a special duty levied
for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly or indirectly, upon
the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise.
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tion by governments of importing countries against the subsidized
products of exporting countries. Article VI does not prohibit sub-
sidies per se as an exception to the basic consultation remedies in
GATT. Instead, Article VI provides a self-help mechanism for
countries to which subsidized goods are imported. It has not been
used extensively as a retaliatory device, however the trend seems to
be is toward an expansion of its use.
Article VI, paragraphs 1 and 2, address themselves to a sub-
sidizing program for a product which results in a dumping situation.
In paragraph 3, a definition of "countervailing duty" (CD) is set
out to mean "a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any
bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly or indirectly, upon the manu-
facture, production or export of any merchandise."'82  This lan-
guage could be read to include almost any subsidy as there is no
reference to any narrower interpretation included elsewhere in the
GATT. Given this reading, nothing adequately explains why coun-
tervailing duties have not been employed more frequently, except
perhaps the sense of double standard which might exist in the minds
of the countervailers.
While limiting the level of countervailing duties to the amount
of "estimated" subsidization granted by the exporting country, para-
graph 3 provides no adequate standard for eliminating subsidies.
Presumably, the difference between the price of the imported prod-
uct and the "like" domestic product could be used as well as the dif-
ference between the price of the good in the importing country and
its domestic price in the exporting country. In spite of the lack of
any clear cut methods of determining injury and subsidization, coun-
tervailing duties have been turned to with greater frequency by the
United States in the last 10 years.' The paucity of complaints by
American businessmen, which are a necessary statutory requirement
to the use of countervailing duties, stem from the fact that member
exporting countries have not been vigilant to insure that rebatable
taxes were actually passed on in the form of higher prices in for-
eign markets. This very situation is exemplified by the aforemen-
tioned failure to develop an adequate uniform test for determining
the amount of shifting that has taken place. It has become more
difficult for the "injured" importing country to determine the
amount of subsidy granted. This indefiniteness would appear to leave
182 GATT, Article VI, paragraph 3.
183 Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax
Adjustments and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty, 19 GEORGETOWN L
CENTER J. L. AND POLICY INT'L BusiNEss 17.
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each country free to shift for itself as far as estimating the amount
of subsidy. Accordingly, the United States Customs Bureau does
not make a concerted effort to determine the amount of shifting
that has taken place in regard to a specific product, but simply ex-
amines the relationship of the particular tax to the product in-
volved. 18 4  An example of the difficulty inherent in determining
the amount of subsidization resulting from an indirect tax rebate
was addressed by the Common Market Countries when it attempted
to decide whether an Italian rebate system was valid under the Trea-
ty of Rome, Article 96.188 In this case the Italian government had
provided a rebate of indirect taxes not based on taxes actually paid
but on an average of taxes paid by all manufacturers of the prod-
uct. This, of course, would result in a subsidy if the actual tax paid
on the product was less than the average. Because the tax was not
imposed upon the product at the various stages of manufacture
but on the productive unit, the entire rebate was held to be a sub-
sidy. However, the question of amount of subsidy was never ad-
dressed. 'Consequently, no formula was developed to provide guide-
lines for the determination of the "estimated" amount of subsidy
for later cases. This lack of accuracy has not prevented counter-
vailing duties from being imposed. The United States has imposed
countervailing duties upon Italian steel units for electrical transmis-
sion towers,' and welded wire mesh.87 Mainly, because under
existing. United States policy, discretion in the President does not
countervail; it is mandatory once a subsidy has been established.
However, if more accurate ways of measuring subsidies could be
devised, perhaps countervailing duties would be used more often.
This still would not answer the question of how an importing coun-
try could determine the level of subsidy which went into a DISC
distributed product imported into its territory and shown to be caus-
ing material injury. Even though only an estimate was required,
unless there was developed an accurate criteria for measuring the
"bounty" the resultant countervailing duty would probably be based
on nothing more than an educated guess.188 1
184 E. Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Re-em erging Issue
in International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT. LAW 82, 116 (1969).
135 Much like Article VI of GATT, Article 96 of the EEC treaty provides for re-
bates when they do not exceed actual internal charges.
136T.D. 67-102, 32 Fed. Reg. 6274 (1967).
131 Id.
1 8 A panel of experts commissioned in 1960 to study both countervailing and anti-
dumping duties spent most of its time on the lattef thus formulating the Anti-dumping
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Another restriction in the use of countervailing duties is con-
tained in paragraph 5 which would forbid countervailing duties if
an anti-dumping duty has been imposed upon the same product.
The policy behind this appears to be that when the "anti-dumping"
duty - which is levied to narrow the difference in price between
what a product costs in its domestic market and the lesser amount
charged in the market to which it is sent - has already been levied,
any subsidy used to achieve the "dumping" effect has already been
offset. However, making countervailing and anti-dumping duties
mutually exclusive in any given situation cannot be seen in any
way as effecting the ultimate result of applying either form of rem-
edy separately. It does appear to foreclose the possibility of apply-
ing both measures so as to yield a protectionist position for a do-
mestically competive product.
Perhaps the most relevant restricting subsection to the discussion
of the DISC is Article VI paragraph 4.119 This excepting provision
supplemented by Article XVI would allow the imposition of a coun-
tervailing duty except when the subsidy came in the form of an
exemption or remission of taxes or duties borne by like products.140
This phase has been interpreted to mean that because direct taxes
are imposed upon a taxpaying entity in the exporting country, and
not the individual product, direct taxes are not included within the
language of this exemption from countervailing duties.' It could
be argued that either countervailing or anti-dumping duties could
be imposed on a product whose import market price was lower sim-
ply because of the exemption from or rebate of direct taxes on the
exporting producer. A similar result could flow from the misap-
Code in 1967. See GATT: 8 BISD 145; GATT: 9 BISD 194, 200 (1961). This Code
does not provide any guidelines for countervailing duties, but argument by analogy can
be resorted to when lack of more definite standards or criteria cannot be found. The
code requires material injury be found prior to the imposition of anti-dumping duties
and can be found by weighing factors such as, was this the principal cause of the injury
or retardation to a developing industry? Were there other factors that retarded or slowed
the growth of this industry?
In an attempt to solve some of the interpretive pzfoblems in Article VI, (1) and (6)
the Code stressed that the mere allegation of material injury would not be adequate as a
basis for the imposition of anti-dumping duties. This restraint could arguably apply
to countervailing duties. Likewise, "convincing evidence" should be required to estab-
lish retardation of an infant industry, T.D. 88-149, 33 Fed. Reg. 8224-25 (1968), and
threat of "matetial" injury should be based upon facts "clearly foreseen" by the export-
ing country.- GAIT, Article VI, paragraph 8 (b).
139 See Article VI, paragraph 4, supra note 117.
140 GATT: Ad Article XVI.
1 4 1 See generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 297 (1969);
E. Butler Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization; A Re-emerging Issue in In-
ternaiona Trade, 9 ViR. J. INTER. LAw 82, 113 (1969).
19721
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 5:87
plication of a GATT authorized rebate on indirect taxes as in the
Italian situation discussed supra,42 or from a direct tax exemption. 4
But again, the "like" product question would come up in much the
same way it does in the anti-dumping situation.
As with many other articles of GATT, Article VI has also un-
dergone interpretive clarification since the signing of the original
Protocal Agreement in 1947.144 In 1948 a GATT working party
provided for additional forms of compensation for injured contract-
ing parties as long as they were consistent with the provisions of
GATT.148  A second amendment expanded the definition of "in-
jury," as used in Article VI, paragraph 6 exclusively, to include situ-
ations where a third country, injured as a result of a countervailing
duty, could be compensated by a contracting party imposing a coun-
tervailing duty.'46 At the end of the Kennedy Round it was postu-
lated that a code to regulate subsidies and countervailing duties
should be promulgated. 147 As yet nothing has developed from this
idea.
According to Article II, paragraph 2(b) 148 a countervailing duty
can be imposed at any time by a contracting party as long as it is
consistent with Article VI. This provision read concurrently with
Article VI, paragraph 6(b) 4 -would preclude the need for the in-
142 See text accompanying notes 134 & 135.
143 This can be exemplified by the indefinite tax deferral provision contained in.
DISC.
144 Protocol Amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of the GATT, 1955
(Agreement No. 33 in App. C).
,145 19 GATT: 2 BISD 41 (1952).
146 20 Protocol Amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of GATT, 1955 (Agree-
ment No. 33, App. C).
147 See K. DAM., THE GATT - LAW AND INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC ORGANI-
ZATION 179 (1970).
148 GATT, Article 11 (2) provides:
Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from imposing at any time
on the importation of any product:
(a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions
of paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the like domestic product or in respect of
an article from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in
whole or in part;
(b) any anti-dumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with the provi-
sions of Article VI;
(c) fees or other charges commensurate with the cost of services rendered.
149 GATT, Article VI, paragraph 6 (b)
"The Contracting Parties may waive the requirement of sub-paragraph (a) of this para-
graph so as to permit a contracting party to levy an anti-dumping or countervailing
duty on the importation of any product for the purpose of offsetting dumping or sub-
sidization which causes or threatens material injury to an industry in the territory of
another contracting party exporting the product concerned to the territory of the im-
porting contracting pafty. The contracting parties shall waive the requirements of sub-
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jured contracting party to show the injury was caused, or threatened,
by the subsidized product before countervailing that product.
Therefore, any country receiving products forwarded by a DISC
might use this remedy to defeat the tax deferral price advantage
upon its own determination. This would be accomplished by the
importing country calling into effect its domestic countervailing duty
statute, which if passed after the 1947 Protocol was signed, would
require the supposedly injured country to show that there has been
a threat or material injury to a domestic industry. "5 The Article II,
paragraph 6(a) provision, with its concomitant equivocation in dis-
tinguishing injury, threatened injury, and retardation, can be shown
to be, a handicap compared to other countries that do not have this
injury provision expressly or impliedly included in their statute.
One country without such a requirement is the United States. Its
countervailing duty statute' 5' does not require that injury be demon-
strable prior to its application. As stated earlier, this would contra-
vene Article VI, paragraph 6(b) but for the fact that the 1947
Protocol to GATT made it applicable "to the fullest extent not
inconsistent with existing (domestic) legislation."'x 2  This exemp-
tion has also allowed the United States to apply its countervailing
duty statute to situations where private subsidies have been given.
However, most GATT contracting parties enacted their statutes after
the GATT's adoption in 1947.1 3
Countries that do not have to establish injury to impose counter-
vailing duties would appear to be able to make even more liberal
use of their statutes because Article VI does not make reference, to
an increase in exports or decrease in imports as a prerequisite to the
paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to permit the levying of a countervailing duty,
in cases in which they find that a subsidy is causing or threatening material injury to an
industry in the territory of another contracting party exporting the product concerned
to the territory of the importing contracting party."
150 GATT, Article VI, paragraph 6 (a) provides:
"No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or countervailing duty on the im-
portation of any product of the territory of another contracting party unless it determines
that the effect of the dumping or subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to cause or
threaten material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to retard mate-
rially the establishment of a domestic industry."
15' 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1964). The amount of duty is determined by the Commis-
sioner of Customs when authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury and it is paid in.ad-
dition to other duties bound into the GAIT schedule 2. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970); 19
C.F.R. § 16.24(e) (1969).
162See GAIT Doc. L/309, Add. (1955); L/2375, Ad. 1, 2 (1965).
15 See Analysis of Anti-dumping Laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Italy and the United Kingdom, A.R.A. Section on Int'l and Comp. L Bull., Dec. 1965
at 20; see also 1 CCH COM. MKT. REP. 5 3883 (1968).
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use of a product subsidy. To this extent, these duties could be used
whenever a subsidy was ever proven Finally, Article VI, paragraph
6, subsection (c),154 which authorizes a contracting party, who might
be injured by any delay in implementation of countervailing duty,
to impose such duty without prior Contracting Party approval, lim-
ited only by a reporting requirement. Although this duty would
have to be withdrawn if it were not approved, this subsection more
dramatically demonstrates the flexibility that the entire Article en-
joys.
If in the particular country affected by DISC importation of
goods, injury would have to be demonstrated prior to the imposi-
tion of a countervailing duty, both injury and causation would have
to be shown for Contracting Party approval. Here, as in anti-dump-
ing duty situations, definitional problems as to "principal cause"
must be faced. Because the remedial action provided an injured
contracting party in the GATT is voluntary, the provisions which
exemplify the spirit of the entire Agreement are Articles XIV,
XVIII, XIX, XXII, XXIII, and XXVIII. All of these articles gen-
erally, and Article XXII specifically, provide for consultation
among the disputants. These Articles in effect create a forum
which today is essential to the orderly solution to international dis-
putes. 155
Under Article XXIII,'" a Working Party can be created to serve
154 GATT, Article.VI para. 6 (c) which reads:
"In exceptional circumstances, however, where delay might cause damage which would
be difficult to repair, a contracting party may levy a countervailing duty for the pur-
pose referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph without the puior approval of
the Contracting Parties; Provided that such action shall be reported immediately to the
Contracting Parties and that the countervailing duty shall be withdrawn promptly if the
Contracting Parties disapprove." Different criteria for injury such as a 50 percent re-
duction in domestic "like" production (if that can be defined) could be used as the
threshold injury for countervailing duty imposition. As mentioned earlier, this re-
quirement does not apply to all countries thus in predicting that immediate counter-
vailing duties could be imposed against the DISC products the individual importing
countries' statute would have to be scrutinized.
155 GATT, Article XXII entitled Consultation states.
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall af-
ford adequate opportunity for consideration regarding such renegotiations as may be
made by another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of
this agreement.
2. The contracting parties may, at the request of a contfacting party, consult with
any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been pos-
sible to find a satisfactory solution though consultation under paragraph 1.
156 GATT, Article XXIII Nullification or Impairment
"I. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment
of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
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the quasi-judicial function of resolving disputes that arise under
GATT. Sometimes a panel - a more objective, non-representative
and less political group of parties convening in a similar capacity
- will be created to solve a problem under the Agreement. In
either case the body thus created will take evidence, hear arguments,
and ultimately resolve the disputed issue. The results of the work-
ing party or panel are then given legal effect through the Contract-
ing Parties' acceptance of the group's report. After the report is
accepted the violative party is required under Article XXII to give
the formulated solution "sympathetic" consideration. 57 Once the
working party rules against a contracting party, the injured party
may be authorized by Article XXIII, paragraph 2, to remove con-
cessions previously granted. The concession withdrawn may not be
of a punative nature, but only up to the amount of the concession
impaired. 5 '
As an alternative to the aforementioned provisions, remedial ac-
tion may be taken by the importing country if unforeseen injury re-
sults from the granting of a concession under the "escape clause"
provision of Article XIX.'59 In such event the injured party may
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement, or
(b) the'application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view to
the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals to
the other contracting party or parties which it considers o be concerned. Any contract-
ing party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations
or proposals made to it."
157 GATT, Article XXIII, para. 1 (c).
158 The use of Article XXIII as a remedial measure has been confirmed by a 1955
Working Party report. GATT: 3 BISD 224 (1955). Since its inception, there have
been 13 calls for consultation under it. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT. 379-80 (1969). A good example of the type of issues involved is found in
the case where Australia removed its subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate to Chile's detri-
ment. Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Report Adopted by the Con-
tracting Parties, April 3, 1950; GATT: 2 BISD 188 (1952).
159 GATT, Article XIX (1 ) provides: Emergency Action on Imports of Particular
Products
"1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations
incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any
pr'oduct is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party
shall be free, in respect of such pr'oduct, and to the extent and for such time as may be
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in
part or to withdraw or modify the concession.
(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect to a prefer,
ence, is being imported into the territory of a contracting party in the circumstances
set forth in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to cause or threaten serious in-
jury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products in the territof'y of
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suspend, withdraw, or modify an equivalent concession if a determi-
nation that a competing domestic industry is "injured" after an
agreement had been negotiated with the offending contracting
party.
As with Article VI, Article XIX is compensatory in nature.
However, before Article XIX can be utilized, a notice to the Con-
tracting Parties"° must be given. Only then can there be consul-
tation among the parties involved, a showing of injury and causa-
tion by the injured party,'61 and finally, if agreement is not reached,
the unilateral suspension of concessions back to their pre-negotiation
level.162 This provision also allows for selective retaliation for any
country which has "substantial interests" in the product upon which
concession was negotiated.
Article XXVIII is another alternative remedial measure. How-
ever, the presence of a three year delay provision, and the fact a
party must make concessions to bring about any change, render this
article less than ideally suited to the control of a tax subsidy such
as DISC." 3 While prior GATT approval is unnecessary, allowing
the negotiating country to retain its retaliatory rights - rights it
will negotiate in light of Article XXVIII - allows the Contract-
ing Parties to designate a country with a principal supplying inter-
est who will also negotiate in regard to some product concessions.
In addition, a country with a "substantial interest" will be allowed
to consult in the negotiations. If an agreement is reached "sub-
stantially equivalent concessions" may be withdrawn by the negoti-
ating party. Although this provision limits retaliation to equiva-
lent concessions it must by its nature be applied with Most Favored
Nation effect. Further, this provision allows easy enforceability
a contracting party which receives or received such preference, the importing contract-
ing patty shall be free, if that other contracting party so requests, to suspend the rele-
vant obligation in whole or in part to withdraw or modify the concession in respect of
the product, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy
such injury."
160 GATT, Article XIX, 5 2.
1611 d. 1 (a).
162 Id. 1 (b).
163 This provision is called into play when the result of subsidization is to effectively
remove the concession granted by one party to a negotiation to another'. While the
negotiations and consultations are called for only once every three years, it provides
a platform from which an injured country, without having to prove injury, can negoti-
ate with an eye on bettering its position with respect to pioducts of the injuring coun-
try which were previously given concessions while rectifying that it knows to be a sub-
sidizing situation.
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plus effectiveness when the two major parties concerned are of
somewhat equal bargaining strength.
In spite of the fact that subsidy levels can be discussed at the
tri-annual negotiation sessions, they hardly ever are.'64 This is
true even though specific authorization for negotiations on this sub-
ject at regular Article XXVIII meetings was provided for by a 1955
Working Party. 6" Subsequently, at the Kennedy Round of trade
negotiations, agricultural export subsidy reductions were dis-
cussed. 66 Although nothing concrete in regard to limitation of
subsidies was decided, the fact that they were brought up appears
to be encouraging index of the diminution of prior reluctance on
the part of these negotiating countries to ignore the fact that each
of them has a subsidization program of some kind in existence.
The last remedial provision of the GATT, Article XXV, para-
graph 5, which in essence amounts to a waiver by one country of
its retaliatory measures in response to what another country might
do to it in violation of GATT. The likelihood of the extensive use
of this program is not great in light of the Contracting Parties sup-
posed commitment to live by the GATT and its objectives.
VII. CONCLUSION
In spite of the lack of a delimiting definition for export subsidiz-
ing behavior proscribed by the GATT, it can be generally said that
any indirect export incentive scheme which would cause a country
to artificially maintain a comparative advantage in a product in
which it normally would not, is a form of subsidy. According to
interpretations of GATT, when such a subsidy is maintained by a
rebate or exemption of direct taxes it will be in violation of vari-
ous GATT provisions including its stated policy objectives of free
trade based on true comparative advantage. The DISC tax defer-
ral which is in effect a permanent forgiveness of a tax liability is
close enough to such an exemption to allow a working party to clas-
sify DISC as a violation of GATT, thus exposing its distributed
product to remedial action by countries who import those goods.
If no remedial action is taken, however, it will be because of the
failure of the contracting parties to diligently eliminate old meth-
ods of direct and indirect subsidization, and avoid the export in-
164 K. DAM, THE GA'T - LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZA-
TION 147 (1970).
l 6 5 GATT: 8 BISD 116 (1960).
166 GATT: 12 BISD 36 (1964).
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centive as a method to artifically stimulate their own employment
and trade balance surpluses. In the spiral of increasingly numer-
ous tax schemes to achieve this latter end, the DISC would appear
to be just another device by which one large contracting party can
with one hand slap free trade on the back and with the other pick
its pocket.
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